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Jia LUO
3770 Keystone Ave. Apt 309, Los Angeles, CA, 90034
(310)-926-5188

jialuo@ucla.edu
Homepage: http://jialuo.bol.ucla.edu

DEGREES

Ph.D., Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (expected)                                June 2007
C.Phil., Economics, University of California, Los Angeles                                       September 2004
M.A. Economics, University of California, Los Angeles                                               March 2005
M.A., Economics, CCER, Beijing University, China                                                         July 2002
B.A., Finance, Renmin University of China                                                                     July 2000

FIELDS

Research: Macroeconomics, Financial Economics, and Public Finance
Teaching: Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, and Econometrics

WORK EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow, Dept. of Economics, UCLA                                         September 2003- present
Discussant at Western Economic Association Conference                                              July 2006
Discussant at Western Social Society Association Conference                                      April 2006
University Community Representative, UCLA                                      September 2005-July 2006
Research Assistant, National Bureau of Economics Research                  July 2005- October 2005
Research Assistant, CCER, Beijing University, China                               January 2002-June 2002
Teaching Assistant, CCER, Beijing University, China                           September 2001-June 2002

RESEARCH PAPERS

“Uncertain Medical Expenses and Portfolio Choice Over the Life Cycle”                  August 2006
(Job Market Paper)
“Health Insurance Coverage of the Near Elderly: Extension of the Medicare System”   April 2006
“Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Consumption Commitments
  --Can Current UI Policy Be Justified?”                                                               February 2006

“Optimal Income Taxation with Enforcement Frictions”
                                       November 2005
“Business Cycles, Policy Distortion and Bank Runs in China”
                                   August 2004
“Test of Myopic Loss Aversion Theory: the Case of Taiwan”                                   March 2004

DISSERTATION
Chairperson: Professor Gary D. Hansen
Expected completion date: June 2007

Title: Uncertain Medical Expenses and Portfolio Choice Over the Life Cycle
In this paper, I explore the effects of uninsurable risk of health expenditures as well as labor income risk on portfolio choice in a realistically calibrated life-cycle model. Most of the existing literature that examines labor income risk and its effect on portfolio composition over the life cycle can provide compelling explanations for the vast differences in portfolios between young and old investors; but few of these studies can explain continued declines in risk-taking with age after retirement. This paper uses MEPS (Medical Expenditure Panel Survey) and HRS (Health and Retirement Study) data to calibrate uncertain medical expenses for the retired. With the consideration of idiosyncratic health expense risk in addition to labor income risk, the model can generate declining financial risk-taking with age after retirement, and therefore
fits the data much better than those studies which consider labor income alone.  Additionally, regressions on simulated data also show that investors with poorer health tend to hold a smaller share of stocks in their portfolios, which is consistent with the empirical pattern of portfolio choice. Finally, using the model I have developed, I predict the impact of changes in government health insurance programs, such as the expansion of the Medicare program, on individuals’ portfolio choices. Simulated results show that a more generous Medicare policy significantly increases the proportion of financial wealth held in equities for the retired.

Title: Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Consumption Commitments: Can Current Policy Be Justified?
In this paper, I propose the optimal design of the unemployment insurance contract in the environment with consumption commitments in which people cannot freely substitute among different goods within a single period. The optimal plan I obtain involves a relatively flat decreasing sequence of insurance payments over some duration, which is then followed by a large drop to a very low level of transfer. The results fit current policy well, therefore give an explanation to justify current policy. Additionally, the model predicts that if we change from the current unemployment insurance program to the optimal contract, the government will only save 1.7% in unemployment payments, which shows that current policy is not as flawed as researchers have traditionally believed. In fact, to achieve efficiency, unemployment transfers should include a jump, similar to what we observe in practice.

AWARDS

Four-year Fellowship, Dept. of Economics, UCLA                                                       2002-2006
Early Advancement to Candidacy Fellowship, Graduate Division, UCLA                               2005
China Economics Research Scholarship, CCER, Beijing University, China                             2002
Excellent Graduate Student Honor, Renmin University of China                                            2000
First Prize Scholarship, Renmin University of China                                                             1999
First Prize Scholarship, Renmin University of China                                                             1998

PERSONAL

Citizenship: P.R.China
Languages: English, Mandarin
Computer Skills: Matlab, Mathematica, Stata, SAS